SECTION 2: SOUND TRUTH
FIVE-YEAR STATUS OF RECOVERY IN PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND
INJURY TO & RECOVERY OF NATURAL RESOURCES
The analyses of key studies found that Exxon’s science was consistently biased to underestimate biological injury and overstate recovery. A summary of the sources of bias found in Exxon’s key studies is presented in Table 1. It can be seen that several studies contained similar problems, such as no or selective reporting of data, extreme pooling of samples, pseudoreplication, inherent inability to detect a difference (low signal-to-noise ratio), implausible results, inappropriate use of statistics, and prejudiced (biased) presentation of study findings.
The studies seem to demonstrate a systemic bias wherein a large and substantial sampling effort was expended, but the effort seems to be intentionally directed at "proving" there was no effect from the spill. This is indicated in such study design parameters as ignoring the use of mussels as water quality indicators, generic definition of "oiled" beaches, inappropriate control sites, small sample size, and lack of long term studies of chronic effects. Exxon's enormous outstanding liability underscores the problem of achieving "neutral," unbiased results with litigation-driven science (Appendix A).
So, we must turn to the government data set to determine the status of Prince William Sound five years after the oil spill. The government data set is also not without its faults, the central one being that many of the studies were designed to assess injuries and quantify recovery, i.e., the studies assumed resources were injured by the spill. Some of the faults were discussed during the analysis of key studies. However, the results and conclusions of the key studies are supported by the data, and data are reported so that results can be verified.
In order to gain a broader perspective on effects, a partial overview of known injury and recovery in individual species is summarized in Table 2. (More detailed descriptions of species’ status are given in Appendix B.)
Four important points can be drawn from this overview.
1. Recovery is patchy and incomplete: while some species have fully recovered from the effects of the oil spill, some have only partially recovered, and others are experiencing on-going injuries and delayed recovery.
2. Long-term effects occur predominately in the intertidal zone and in species that either feed or breed in the intertidal (and shallow subtidal) zone.
3. Oil-contaminated mussels may be a primary cause of long-term effects: several species experiencing long-term effects depend on mussels for a large portion of their diet.
4. Because of the ongoing long-term effects, the time period for complete recovery is unknown.
Long-term (multi-generation) effects were not anticipated (Winter 1992). While evidence for long-term effects from oil spills is documented in the literature (Elmgren et al. 1983, Rolan & Gallagher 1991, Sanders 1978, Thomas 1977), the bulk of the research has focused on short-term effects, which is the nature of NRDA research. However, "sinking" oil and its incorporation into bottom sediments was generally recognized at the time of the Exxon Valdez spill(1) "as presenting the single greatest and long-term threat to the environment from oil spill accidents" (Laevastu & Fukuhara 1985 p. 3).
A couple years passed before reproductive problems in pink salmon and herring became apparent as progressively increasing egg mortality in wild streams (observed in 1989-1991, in Bue et al. 1993), pink run failures of offspring from fish exposed to oil (observed in 1992-1993, in ADF&G 1993, 1994), and reproductive impairment in the 1988 year class of herring, which had been exposed to oil as 1-year old fish (observed in 1992, in Kocan & Mehl 1993). Paralleling the work with herring (Kocan et al. accepted 1994), experiments were started with pink salmon to determine if these reproductive problems could be reproduced in the lab.
Meanwhile, harlequin ducks and oystercatchers in western Prince William Sound were failing to reproduce: populations were down to 11% and 42% of the pre-spill levels, respectively (Peterson 1993). Mortalities of weanling sea otters were abnormally high, and river otters were of poor body condition in the western versus eastern Sound between 1990-1992 (EVOS Trustees 1992, Bowyer et al. 1992). All of these organisms depend on mussels for a principal part of their diet, and the intertidal mussels in western Prince William Sound remain heavily contaminated with Exxon Valdez oil (Babcock et al. 1993).
Laboratory studies confirming field evidence of reproductive impairment from exposure to oil are only recently available for herring (Hose et al. accepted 1993a, b, Kocan et al. accepted 1994, Norcross et al. accepted 1993), and pink salmon (Bue 1993), but the run failures of pink salmon in 1992 and 1993 and of herring in 1993 point to more widespread effects.
In 1993, the Prince William Sound herring appear to have succumbed to a disease that may have caused the mortality of two thirds of the population. Fish previously exposed to oil have been found to be more susceptible to disease because of weakened immune systems (Arkoosh et al. 1991), and many of the herring comprising the 1993 return had been exposed to oil as adults in 1989. Further, fish are known to take up substantial levels of aromatic hydrocarbons from the water or their diet (McCain et al. 1990, Roubal et al. 1977).
These persistent biological effects in birds, mammals, and fish are strong evidence that oil-contaminants are still present in the environment. The absence of hydrocarbons alone is not a reliable indicator of availability of these compounds to marine organisms. For example, pink salmon embryos were found to accumulate hydrocarbons at levels of at least 80 times the ambient water concentration, and effects were observed on survival, metabolism and osmoregulation at hydrocarbon levels that could not be detected in the test water (Rice et al. 1994). The demonstrated ability of marine organisms to respond to pollutants at levels below the limits of detection of analytical equipment is the basis of the well-accepted "triad approach" to toxicity testing (Long & Chapman 1985).
The dramatic reductions in certain populations of marine mammals, birds and fish caused by the oil spill have seriously altered the structure, composition and dynamic interrelationships in the affected coastal ecosystem. Indirect (ripple), long-term, and delayed effects are just starting to appear.
For example, a large decline in herring, a "cornerstone" species, has severe implications for over 40 predatory species including pigeon guillemot, marbled and Kittlitz’s murrelet, common and thick-billed murre, black-legged kittiwake, mew gull, harbor seal and Steller sea lion (Peterson 1993). Similarly, the decline in pink salmon, another cornerstone species, will have severe ripple effects through the foodweb, especially for several marine mammals (Peterson 1993).
Continuing indirect damages are becoming evident in other areas. For instance, the 1993 population explosion of green sea urchins in western Prince William Sound most likely resulted from the large reduction of their primary predator - sea otters. This is the initial phase of the formation of "urchin barrens," where urchins clean the shallow subtidal seafloor of kelps and marcoalgae. Such barrens can have severe secondary impacts on fish and crustaceans that use the algal beds as nursery and foraging habitat (Peterson 1993).
In summary, the biological damage caused by the Exxon Valdez oil spill was severe and unprecedented. While some recovery has occurred, significant components of the ecosystem continue to exhibit serious impact, and probably will for decades to come.
INJURY TO & RECOVERY OF HUMAN RESOURCES
The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill & Alaskan Communities
The Exxon Valdez oil spill immediately disrupted subsistence and commercial harvests of Prince William Sound communities. The spring herring fisheries were closed by state management biologists due to oil. The annual spring tradition of gathering herring roe and other subsistence foods from beaches was halted by the physical coating of oil on beaches in the southwest area of the Sound.
And that was just the beginning.
Prior to the spill, government scientists documented subsistence harvests in 15 predominantly Native Alaskan communities in Prince William Sound, the Kenai Peninsula, Cook Inlet and Kodiak (Fall 1991). Subistence harvests ranged from 200 pounds per person to 600 pounds per person usable weight per year(1), and included a wide variety of resources such as fish, shellfish, marine invertebrates, land and marine mammals, birds and eggs, and wild plants (Fall 1993).
In 1990, government studies found that subsistence harvests in these same 15 communities declined up to 77% in villages in oiled areas, while diversity of foods harvested declined by up to half (Fall 1990). For example, residents in Chenega Bay (Prince William Sound) harvested 19 kinds of wild foods and an average of 342 pounds per person in 1985-86 compared to 8 kinds and 148 pounds in 1990 (Fall 1990, 1993a). Similar patterns were observed in other Prince William Sound communities and in Kodiak and villages on the eastern side of the Kenai Peninsula (Fall 1990, 1991).
By 1991, some recovery of subsistence harvests had occurred in Kodiak and lower Cook Inlet, but little in Prince William Sound villages, where direct observations by subsistence harvesters of oil on beaches led to continuing concerns about oil contamination (Fall 1993a).
Fear of oil contamination and its potential (latent) effects was the main reason found for the decline in subsistence harvests (Fall 1991, 1993a, Impact Assessment, Inc. 1990, Smythe 1990): 93% of community leaders reported that residents refused to eat food that had been in contact with oil (Araji 1992a). Villagers were skeptical of government health officials who said that if resources did not smell or taste oily, they were "almost certainly safe to eat" (ADHHS 1989), and of other government reports which found that subsistence foods were contaminated with low levels of oil, but posed only "minimal" health risks (Stein et al. 1993, Brown et al. 1993).
Residents also felt sympathy for the wild animals and were reluctant to add to their already high mortalities. This empathy contributed to changes in subsistence harvest patterns in the years immediately after the spill. As one Tatitlek man said, "When you hear thousands of them [waterfowl] are dying everyday, it’s tough to harvest them" (Fall 1993a). Subsistence harvests in Prince William Sound still had not fully recovered by 1993 because of shortages of natural resources (Fall 1994).
While greater impacts to subsistence harvests and related cultural activities were found in Native villages than in cross-cultural communities like Cordova, Valdez, Seward and Kodiak (Impact Assessment, Inc. 1990), several studies clearly documented that the basic social fabric of many coastal communities in the spill-impacted region unraveled as a result of the spill.
Studies have found dramatic increases in post-spill general anxiety disorder, post traumatic stress disorder, depression, drinking, drug use, domestic violence, conflict among friends, and damaged family ties (Araji 1992a, b, Donald et al. 1990, Dyer et al. 1992, Endter-Wada et al. 1993, Impact Assessment, Inc. 1990, McNabb 1993, Picou et al. 1992, and Smythe 1990). Studies also found dramatic decreases in social visitation within some Native communities and reduced participation in community celebrations and religious services. The root cause of these problems was breakdown of activities associated with commercial fishing and subsistence–the sharing and harvest of natural resources (Dyer et al. 1992, Picou et al. 1992).
Emotional problems at the individual and community levels occurred not only in response to the spill itself, but also in response to Exxon’s beach cleanup and Exxon’s misinformation campaign. For example, studies found that the cleanup process actually hindered the healing process, because it was a structure imposed from outside the communities and it discouraged local efforts, increasing the feeling of helplessness (Impact Assessment, Inc. 1990, Mayer 1993). Also, many believed that Exxon was purposefully creating divisiveness within communities by selective hire practices (real or perceived) to prevent a concerted effort forming against it (Mayer 1993). Pressured by a growing social consensus regarding the severity of the spill and its impacts, Exxon countered with a misinformation campaign to mitigate damage which, ultimately, worsened rather than improved public relations (CBS 60 Minutes 1993, Davidson 1990, Keeble 1991).
The extent of emotional problems–up to 700% increase in some communities (Endter-Wada et al. 1993)–is best summarized by Dolly Reft, a Native leader in Kodiak. "If people don’t have authority over their environment or themselves, their spirit and their will to live get weaker and they are more vulnerable to things they can normally handle. We are experiencing a high rate of alcoholism and suicide. This summer we’ve had eight suicides in six weeks" (Davidson 1990).
Emotional trauma is again on the increase in coastal communities in Prince William Sound as spill-induced long-term damages manifest as pink salmon and herring run failures (Gill 1994, Picou & Gill 1994 draft). Frustrated fishermen blockaded tanker traffic for three days in August, 1993, to focus scientific and national attention on emerging long-term damages in Prince William Sound, the "Dead Zone" (Anchorage Daily News 1993, Rinehart 1993, Rosen 1993). For Cordova fishermen, there just aren’t many other options for work (Bernton 1993, Cherrington 1993).
Social & Psychological Injuries
The Exxon Valdez oil spill has had an extraordinary destabilizing effect on human communities. Natural resource-based communities, such as most of those in the spill region, are particularly vulnerable to disruption and stress caused by toxic, man-made disasters (Edelstein 1988, Picou et al. 1992). Further, technological (versus natural) disasters tend to create community dissensus (versus consensus), which hinders the healing process and leaves a devastating and enduring impact (Freudenburg & Jones 1991, Gill & Picou 1991a).
The Social Fabric: Natural Resource Communities
The subsistence and coastal fishing communities in Prince William Sound and other spill-impacted areas are all natural resource communities which, according to Dyer et al. (1992), are populations living within an area "whose primary cultural existence is based on the utilization of renewable natural resources."
Sharing of natural resources is the mortar that builds and maintains social networks, and establishes a sense of well-being. "Sharing" as it defines the subsistence culture in the predominantly Native villages in this region is described by Eyak Native Patience Anderson Faulkner (1992) (edited):
"Pre-gathering activities include preparing the implements for gathering or capture, or lessons in using the implements, or a story-telling in the manner of folklore or in actual experience. The time spent together preparing for the activity is important: it prepares the individual, and strengthens bonds between co-gatherers and among the entire subsistence group.
"Gathering activities are of utmost importance as they are the tests of lessons taught. Each activity helps measure the quality of time spent to demonstrate a skill, and to determine whether it is necessary to extend the time concentrating on the specific skill or to continue with the lessons of life. During the gathering cycle, individuals develop the skills which establish the success status that must be earned.
"Post-gathering activities include food preparation immediately or for a later time. Those involved can be a group, or several together, or individually. During the social gathering, events leading to the post-gathering are recanted and skills are reviewed.
"It is during the cycles of subsistence that bonding is strengthened and expanded. The sense of worth is solidified and new skills are learned. It is during these bonding times that our individual value is placed within our community, and we are able to understand what we must do to preserve our lives and to live in harmony."
Sharing as it defines the subsistence lifestyle in predominantly non-Native coastal communities such as Cordova, Valdez, Seward, and Kodiak is described by Dyer et al.
(1992):
"The most important natural resource in Prince William Sound, both for commercial and subsistence purposes, is fisheries. The preparation phase includes all activities involving the readying of gear, identification of target areas, crew selection, and, if appropriate, training. The harvesting phase is the actual event of resource collection and preparation. The utilization phase involves all activities associated with the conversion of the catch to usable resources. The final phase, anticipation, is an interim "resting" period in which assessments of the previous harvest season and predictions about the upcoming season guide decisions for future behavior in the fishery."
The social fabric of these communities is a blend of cultures in which non-Natives actively participate in natural resource harvesting and sharing, and Natives participate in the cash economy (Dyer et al. 1992). For example, Cordova’s population is about one-fifth (18%) Native Alaskan, but almost everyone relies to some extent on subsistence hunting and fishing (mostly for winter food) and over 90% of the households share resources (Cherrington 1993, Dyer et al. 1992).
These life cycles in natural resource communities turn with the seasons to become the years that form a lifestyle. This lifestyle is an intricate web of behaviors and social interactions that gives a sense of worth to individuals, strength to families, and structure to society. All are bonded through one central commonality: the sharing of natural resources.
Rending the Social Fabric: Technological Disasters
in Natural Resource Communities
Natural resource communities are particularly vulnerable to technological disasters (Picou et al. 1992). Injury to natural resources disrupts the pattern of sharing that forms the critical link between the community and the environment, and among the community members.
Three distinct problems have been identified in communities experiencing technological accidents:
"(1) the ambiguity of biophysical damage;
(2) the likelihood of a corrosive, rather than therapeutic, ‘post-disaster’ phase, and
(3) the overall tendencies toward socio-cultural disruption" (Freudenburg & Jones 1991, p. 1156; emphasis in original).
While natural disasters tend to create physical havoc, technological disasters create mental traumas that impede individual and community recovery (Gill & Picou 1991a). Contamination of air, water, soil or natural resources (food) may leave buildings and boats untouched, but it cripples the human mind with uncertainty, ambiguity, and despair. These are the fears that disturb the dreams of adults and children by night, and tear apart communities by day.
In natural disasters, once the damage is done, communities can start to rebuild with financial aid from insurance companies and government-subsidized low interest loans through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (Cherrington 1993). But in technological disasters, usually the only way for individuals and communities to recoup their losses is to sue the responsible party in court. The contention, delay, uncertainty and frustration generated by litigation can be almost as destructive as the disaster itself, and can contribute to long-terms stresses and continuing social upheaval, (according to Picou, in Cherrington 1993).
Thus, communities suffering from technological disasters, such as the poisonous gas leak in Bhopal or the radiation leak at Three Mile Island, tend to experience long-term collective stress fed daily by continuing disruptions and uncertainty (Gill & Picou 1991b, Picou et al. 1992). In natural resource communities, these stresses are compounded when the resources, upon which the culture and economy are based, are injured or destroyed.
The general consensus throughout the spill-impacted region is that the people and communities will recover only when the environment has fully recovered.
ECONOMIC DAMAGES TO NATURAL & HUMAN RESOURCES
By any accounting, the economic impact of the Exxon Valdez oil spill has been enormous, and there are still billions of dollars more at stake.
Native & Landowner Claims
Natives have subsistence fished, hunted, and gathered in southcentral Alaska in the areas affected by the Exxon Valdez oil spill for thousands of years. Traditional subsistence beaches used for generations within living memory were coated in thick smelly oil, and high levels of oil remained trapped under mussel beds in 1993 (Peterson 1993, Rice et al. 1993) Instead of walking these beaches to gather their bounty in celebration of renewal each spring, Native leader Gail Evanoff finds herself showing the inedible mussel beds to news media (pers. comm., Mauer 1991).
The cultural upheaval from the spill was unprecedented: the very activity which defines subsistence lifestyle, sharing of natural resources, was all but destroyed. As one Native said, "They [Exxon] have ruined a lifestyle."
Eyak Native Patience Anderson Faulkner (1992) asks, "How can one place a value in dollar markers on the subsistence way of life? What is the value of camaraderie? What is the value of a story or folklore? What is the value of learning how to cope with life’s challenges? What is the value of introducing a grandchild to his grandparent or aunt or uncle? What is the replacement cost of a grandparent’s health and state of mind? An opportunity has been lost, a sense of belonging has been weakened, our self-worth has been questioned.
"The answer is: it is impossible for me to determine the dollar marker value..."
Native Alaskans have filed claims of $619 million and $152 million against Exxon for damages to subsistence culture and land, respectively, from the Exxon Valdez oil spill (INRE 1994), but money cannot restore what has been lost to them.
Commercial Fishermen Claims
The spill forced the 1989 closure of herring fisheries in Prince William Sound, outer and eastern Cook Inlet, and thirty-four of the fifty-six Kodiak districts. Salmon fisheries were closed in most of Prince William Sound, Cook Inlet, Kodiak and partially at Chignik. Many smaller fisheries also were closed, including pot shrimp, blackcod, bottomfish and crab in Prince William Sound.
In addition to actual closures, the spill also lowered seafood prices statewide, including in Bristol Bay and southeast Alaska, and reduced the value of commercial limited entry permits and fishing boats. For example, in early 1989, Prince William Sound seine permits were worth $300,000; now (spring 1994) they are worth about $50,000 (Pacific Fishing 1994). The crash in permit value is a direct reflection of the uncertain future of the Prince William Sound pink salmon fishery.
Attorneys for the 20,000 or so private plaintiffs against Exxon have documented about $2.9 billion in lost income, including $166 billion from salmon and herring fisheries, and boat and permit devaluations in southcentral Alaska alone (INRE 1994).
Municipal & Business Claims:
Lost revenue to fishermen translates directly to lost revenues to the state, municipalities, and other programs which tax the fishing industry. For example, the Prince William Sound Aquaculture Corporation’s 2% enhancement tax on all salmon species generated $1,457,617 in 1988 versus $629,872 in 1992. The City of Cordova’s revenue from raw fish tax collected on the 1988 fishing harvest was $1,294,707 versus $561,156 on the 1992 harvest. Cordova dropped from eighth largest seaport in the nation in 1988, based on ex-vessel value of seafood landed, to twenty-seventh in 1992. This tremendous loss of capital has affected individuals, shoreside businesses, and entire communities dependent on commercial fishing.
The following claims have been documented and filed:
Aquaculture $31 million
Area Businesses $47 million
Cannery Workers $24 million
Municipalities $100 million
Native Corporations $210 million
Processors $102 million
Recreational Users $3.6 million
Claims total $4.2 billion (INRE 1994). Focus groups for attorneys on both sides have said that if the case goes to trial (as early as May 1994), they would award compensatory and punitive damages to fishermen, Natives, municipalities and shoreside businesses in the range of tens of billions of dollars.
In August 1993, Alyeska agreed to pay private plaintiffs $98 million to settle its liability for not responding adequately to the spill, but Exxon filed an injunction (Toomey 1993). The settlement is currently in limbo.
Physical Health Claims
Cleanup workers experienced an average oil mist exposure 12 times in excess of permissible exposure limits (Reller 1993). A maximum overexposure of 400 times the permissible exposure limit was found on a hot water beach (Reller 1993). NIOSH reported 1,811 worker’s filed compensation claims in 1989, most with respiratory system damage (Reller 1993). It is unknown how much Exxon has paid to settle these claims.
Criminal Plea Agreement
Exxon was fined $150 million for violation of the Clean Water Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and the Rivers and Harbors Act. Of this amount, $125 million was forgiven for their (alleged) "cooperation with the governments during the cleanup, timely payout of many private claims, and environmental precautions taken since the spill" (Marine Advisory Program 1992).
Exxon also agreed to pay $100 million as restitution to state and federal governments, which must in turn use the funds for restoration projects (Marine Advisory Program 1992).
Civil Settlements for Natural Resource Damages
Government-sponsored economic analyses estimated the "cost" of damages to natural resources at about $2.8 billion (Phillips 1993). Exxon agreed to pay the federal and state governments about $900 million over 10 years to settle this liability (Marine Advisory Program 1992). The civil settlement also has a $100 million reopener clause, to restore documentable long-term damages of habitats or species. Alyeska settled its outstanding lawsuits for natural resource damages with the state and federal governments by paying $32 million (Financial Times 1992).
Cleanup & Response Costs
Exxon paid about $2.5 billion in costs associated with its response to the spill, but filed suit against its insurance companies to recover some of these expenses and liabilities (Pyle 1993). More than 100 insurance companies counter-sued, maintaining that the cleanup was a public relations ploy (Pyle 1993). The costs of the attorneys’ fees is unknown.
(1)The failure of NOAA natural resource trustees to completely address the problem of "sinking" oil during the Exxon Valdez oil spill undermined the scientists' credibility and remains a sore point with the public to this day (NPR 1994).
(2)Harvest are based on wet weights, but much of the food is dried to preserve it. By comparison, the average American family purchases about 222 pounds per person of meat, fish, and poultry annually (Fall 1990).